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 Current neuropsychological understanding of consciousness as 
influenced by antecedent arguments in the philosophy of mind 
Jeff Kerr 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to describe antecedent influences of philosophy on 
modern neuropsychological conceptions of consciousness. I will first describe a brief 
philosophical history of consciousness in the form of several famous arguments, which 
underlie modern understanding of the phenomenon. As a result, I will illustrate how 
modern neuroscientific theories of consciousness are very much a melody of multi-
disciplinary historical ideas, which play notable roles in directing neuroscience 
investigation. 
 The very early theories of consciousness were almost exclusively philosophical 
in nature. The most explicit of these early philosophies are those that viewed the mind 
from a dualistic perspective, which considered mind and body as separate entities that 
were not necessarily physically connected. The most famous of these philosophies is 
found within Descartes’ 2nd mediation written in the 15th century, entitled “Cartesian 
Dualism” (1). Specifically, his argument stated that the only aspect of humanness one 
can be certain of is that of his or her own mind. In essence, because I know that I think 
(I can hear my consciousness), this is the only aspect of myself I can be certain exists. 
As a result, I cannot be so certain about the existence of my body. Thus, they must be 
fundamentally different in some way (1). Later, he elaborates on this premise, stating 
that the mind exists in some nonphysical realm, outside of reality, due to the private 
nature of our thoughts. The body, however, exists in physical space, because my 
material essence is necessarily public (1).  
  It was not until the early 20th century until philosophers began conceiving of 
mental properties as physical events with respect to fundamental laws of physics. 
Philosophers David Armstrong and W.T. Stace directed the philosophy of mind towards 
this goal. Both are considered naturalists; a school of thought which claims that 
“nonphysical events” (those supposedly incapable of being explained by 
epistemological methods) have no place in scientific investigation (4). In the 1950’s, 
Stace and Armstrong proposed the mind-brain identity theory, proposing that mental 
properties are identical to physical properties. For example, mental events such as pain 
must have some corresponding physical cause, such as neural activity or cell 
physiology (2). Therefore, for every mental state, there is a physical state of the brain. 
Moreover, rather than pain causing neurons to fire or neurons causing the sensation of 
pain, pain is both those neurons and the sensation responsible for pain. To exemplify 
this, tissue damage occurs (input), causing “pain neurons” to fire, which subsequently 
causes the physical expression of pain, like crying (output). Because functionalists view 
mental processing as result of qualitative cause-and-effect, with mental states defined 
by their respective causal role, many philosophers and computer scientists view this 
processing analogous to the methods of computers (1). With series and series of 
algorithms resembling complex neural networks, this led to debate over the possibility of 
artificial intelligence.  
As a whole, each of these philosophies discussed above can be interpreted in 
terms of modern problems in neuroscience. Even the dualist perspective of Descartes 
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can be used to analyze the qualitative effects of phantom limb. For example, phantom 
limb pain is experienced at a location that does not exist (where the limb used to be) (2). 
In effect, it is convenient to assume that such pain exists in some nonphysical space. Of 
course, the dualistic perspective is widely dismissed in the scientific community due to 
its emphasis on nonphysical entities, and advances in modern neurobiology. 
Nevertheless, functions of consciousness can be defined psychologically as well, in 
which researchers search for the neurophysiological functions that define them (5). 
However, the capabilities of modern neuroscience has also allowed for the analysis of 
consciousness in reverse fashion – the ability to stimulate neurons in a variety of ways 
to analyze their behavioral result.  
Nevertheless, currently, there still exists great philosophical debate over how to 
describe consciousness in both the scientific and philosophical realm. However, 
philosophers are beginning to incorporate neuroscientific advances into the formation of 
philosophies of science and mind. For instance, the modern theory of emergence 
explains that higher level functioning must be a result of the processes of its makeup. In 
other words, consciousness is a “higher level” or systemic brain function that only 
emerges through the complex interaction of “lower level” parts, like neurons, atoms and 
molecules (5). In effect, consciousness emerges from these lower level processes, 
which, themselves, do not possess consciousness. Under this perspective, thought 
formation should be able to be studied both from a bottom-up and top-down analysis.  
Furthermore, only recently has science considered consciousness as suitable for 
scientific investigation. Due to its subjective nature and first-person “ontology”, it has 
been difficult to designate it as a function analogous to digestion or metabolism (6). To 
consider the investigation of consciousness via scientific methods, we must allow that 
consciousness to be defined by brain functioning, and is, in a sense, an “organ of the 
brain” (3). Moreover, consciousness can be defined as, at a minimum, the awareness of 
certain sensory processes, motor initiation and control, control over some physiological 
states, and cognition (7). One of the most important developments in explaining 
consciousness are split-brain studies, in which the corpus callosum, the structure 
separating the left and right hemispheres, was leisoned as a treatment for epilepsy. This 
effectively separated the communication between hemispheres, revealing startling 
results. The effects of these studies revealed the presence of “double 
consciousnesses”, with the right hemisphere possessing a different consciousness than 
the left (3). Moreover, different hemispheres seemed to contribute different aspects to 
consciousness; the non-dominant hemisphere dealt more with synthesizing information 
and controlling appropriate social behavior whereas the dominant hemisphere 
controlled discrimination and general awareness (3).  
Furthermore, possibly the most famous of split-brain studies was conducted by 
H.W. Sperry in 1982. He concluded that each hemisphere seemed to behave 
independently of one another, with each possessing its own perceptions, learning, and 
memory experiences (8,9). For instance, a split-brain patient may be going about their 
daily business when their left hand spontaneously rises to pick an article of clothing 
from the closet while attention was focused on an unrelated piece of clothing. This 
suggests that a full awareness or consciousness is necessitated by the interconnection 
of hemispheres. In other words, when a patient’s corpus callosum is severed, the two 
hemispheres communicate imperfectly, resulting in an imperfect consciousness (6). 
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Moreover, the integration of innumerable neural pathways in consciousness is 
analogous to the visual system. For instance, in vision, anatomically different neurons 
are responsible for different functions, such as angle, color, length, etc. Each of these is 
integrated through a systematic network to produce perceptual experience (6) 
In effect, the field of philosophy has for centuries attempted to tackle the issue of 
consciousness, due to its puzzling nature and first-person subjectivity. However, 
problems arose when trying to describe it through the use of scientific methodologies. 
Because conscious states only exist when they are personally experienced, it is awfully 
difficult to investigate its processes in an objective manner. However, as philosophical 
accounts of consciousness progressed in time, they began to incorporate and remain 
open to neuroscientific explanation, like modeling neural networks through 
supercomputers and neuropsychological explanations of split-brain studies. As a result, 
modern neuroscience appears ready to tackle consciousness as a biological 
occurrence, with a make-up of electrical, cellular, and physical processes. Yet the lens 
through which we view consciousness, theoretically, as an entity, has been crafted by 
centuries of philosophical debate. In effect, despite advances in neuroscientific 
instrumentation, like fMRI imaging that popularly will “read your thoughts”, scientists and 
philosophers alike have not quite settled on an explanation of consciousness. Only until 
this is settled, that we may realize the biological basis, psychological function, and 
evolutionary importance of consciousness itself.  
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